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ABSTRACT 
Gender and Ethnic Diversity in US Boardrooms:  
Is the Glass Ceiling Stifling Firm Financial Growth? 
by 
Dionne Roberts 
May 2017 
Committee Chair: Dr. Subhashish Samaddar 
Major Academic Unit: Robinson College of Business 
 The purpose of this research was to explore the relationship between diversity within the 
boards of directors of American companies and firm financial growth. Specifically, this study 
sought to determine the question of whether a relationship exists between medium-term growth 
in a firm’s accounting returns and the inclusion of a) minority women, b) ethnic minorities, or c) 
women on its board of directors. The supporting analysis for this inquiry included an in-depth 
examination of the five-year growth rates in ROE, ROA, and profit margins of 439 companies 
between 2011 and 2015. These companies operate across eight industry groups and are listed 
either on the New York Stock Exchange or the NASDAQ stock index. Results of the statistical 
analyses show significant increases in financial growth for companies with gender- and 
ethnically-diverse boards (when compared to boards consisting solely of white men). However, 
based on effect sizes, the most significant increases were found in the profit margins of 
companies with minority directors. 
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I INTRODUCTION 
I.1 Research Problem 
The academic community has been instrumental in investigating racial and gender 
diversity (or the lack thereof) within American businesses since the 1970s, which marked the end 
of the Civil Rights Movement and the beginning of the second wave of the Feminist Movement 
(Joshi, Neely, Emrich, Griffiths, & George, 2015, p. 1461). Figure 1 below, taken directly from 
this Academy of Management Journal article, displays the quantity of research published in the 
journal on women’s issues from that time frame through 2010. As the chart shows, only about 20 
articles on women’s studies were published during the 1970s. However, this number nearly 
doubled during the 1980s but then slowly declined in each decade thereafter to a steady rate of 
about 15 articles per year. 
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Figure 1: Number of Articles of Women’s Issues 
Number of articles on women's issues published in Academy of Management Journal from 1970 to 2010.  
Adapted from “Gender Research in AMJ: An Overview of Five Decades of Empirical Research and Calls to Action” (p. 1460) by A. 
Joshi, B. Neely, C. Emrich, D. Griffiths, & G. George, 2015, Academy of Management Journal. Copyright 2015 by Academy of 
Management. Adapted with permission. 
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Mainstream literature in the field of corporate diversity has centered on the phenomenon 
of the limited inclusion of women and ethnic minorities (hereafter referred to as minorities) in 
top management/corporate executive positions and on boards of directors and on its potential 
causes and effects. Because of widespread discrimination practices, which were legal in the 
United States until the Civil Rights Act of 1964 went into effect, the country’s workforce of 
women and minorities experienced limited occupational opportunities until the 1970s. During 
that period, private corporations as well as governmental agencies, often propelled by affirmative 
action policies, were under fire to achieve an adequate amount of diversity during employee 
recruitment efforts.  
As a result of these efforts, some progress has been made in the sphere of women’s 
advancement into directorships. Although less than 5% of all directors on the boards of Fortune 
1000 companies were women in 1987 (Hillman, Canella, & Harris, 2002), more than two 
decades later, this percentage has gradually risen to 20% (“Missing Pieces Report”, 2017), as 
shown in Table 1 below. On the other hand, the number of minority directors has remained 
stagnant. Table 1 and Figure 2 below both show that minorities currently hold just 14% of total 
directorships, while minority women make up less than 4%. 
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Table 1: Fortune 500 Board Seats by Gender and Ethnicity  
(2010, 2012, and 2016)   
 
Note: Reprinted from “Missing Pieces Report: The 2016 Board Diversity Census of Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards” 
(p. 4) by The Alliance for Board Diversity. 2017. Deloitte Development LLC. Copyright 2017 by Catalyst, Diversified Search, The 
Executive Leadership Council, the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility, and Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, 
Inc. Reprinted with permission.  
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Figure 2: Percent of Board Seats by Gender and Ethnicity 
Percentage of board seats held within Fortune 500 companies by gender and ethnicity during 
2010, 2012, and 2016. Reprinted from “Missing Pieces Report: The 2016 Board Diversity 
Census of Women and Minorities on Fortune 500 Boards” (p. 3) by The Alliance for Board 
Diversity, 2017. Deloitte Development LLC. Copyright 2017 by Catalyst, Diversified Search, 
The Executive Leadership Council, the Hispanic Association on Corporate Responsibility, and 
Leadership Education for Asian Pacifics, Inc. Reprinted with permission.  
Table 1 and Figure 2 both display the stark contrast of the percentage of men on 
corporate boards against the percentage of women and minorities. Furthermore, the majority of 
research on corporate board diversity in the United States has tended to focus predominantly on 
women’s studies (Darmadi, 2013; Ntim, 2015), driving an explicit need for more research 
specifically on minority women’s studies in the country. Underscoring the importance of 
research in the underserved area of ethnic diversity within corporate boards are the protracted 
advancements outlined in the previous paragraph and the realization that, by 2044, over half of 
the population of the United States will be classified as an ethnic minority (Colby & Ortman, 
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2015, p. 1). Accordingly, an increased focus on ethnic contrasts could bolster the impact of 
research on women directors.  
The absence of gender- and ethnically- diverse directors in the boards of American 
companies is problematic because it limits the range of perspectives and insights that the board is 
able to offer as it relates to the strategic direction of the firm. The current research subscribes to 
the active school of thought on the subject of board of director involvement in strategy 
development. In contrast to the passive school of thought, the active school’s perspective is that a 
board of directors, in partnership with the senior management team, is responsible for developing 
the firm’s strategy and operational objectives (Barroso-Castro, Vellegas-Periñan, Dominguez, 
2017). Therefore, logically, the strategic decisions of the board have the potential to impact the 
financial results of the firm. In light of the relationship between the board’s role in strategy 
development and the firm’s financial results, the outcomes of the current research may be used to 
provide a source of competitive advantage for businesses willing to recruit potential leaders from 
these historically underrepresented demographic groups.  
In response to the push for diversity in corporate leadership as described in previous 
sections, researchers have begun to focus on the performance of women and minorities who do 
gain entry to upper echelons of the corporate leadership. As I have described in more detail in the 
literature review section, there are conflicting results within the extant research on the question 
of whether these attributes of diversity in corporate directors add value to a firm’s financial 
results (Frijns, Dodd, & Cimerova, 2016; Post & Byron, 2015; Zahra & Stanton, 1988).   
Taking these conflicting reports into consideration, this research sought to expand upon 
prior knowledge by not only focusing on ethnic and gender diversity separately, but also 
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investigating the combined factors to determine whether the inclusion of minority women 
directors, specifically, is also related to increased financial growth.  
I.2 Contribution to Academic Research 
The combined study of gender and ethnicity is an under-developed stream of research 
within the field of corporate governance. Rather, the prevailing research on diversity within this 
area has focused narrowly on two classifications of diversity in this area. One common 
classification is the inclusion of women and minorities on corporate boards (as one combined 
diversity group), while another common classification is women or minorities (as two separate 
diversity groups). Research using these two classifications of diversity has failed to distinguish 
between the results of the broader classifications and those that are associated with the distinct 
gender and ethnic attributes that coexist within one individual. In contrast, this study’s more 
holistic approach did, in fact, distinguish between these attributes and attempted to identify the 
outcomes associated with each (i.e.., the inclusion of minority women, the inclusion of minorities 
of either gender, and the inclusion of women of any ethnicity on corporate boards), presenting 
them on a case-by-case basis. By investigating whether each diversity factor (i.e., gender and/or 
minority status) represented within a firm’s board contributed separately or in combination to the 
firm’s financial growth, this research has added clarity to the extant research.  
This study also diverged from the mainstream by exploring medium-term growth rather 
than short-term or long-term performance. Much of the prior research used year-over-year 
financial performance measures or those associated with even shorter time spans (Barton & 
Wiseman, 2015). According to Barton and Wiseman, this outlook does not synchronize with the 
board’s primary responsibility of establishing firm strategy. Furthermore, this common 
orientation toward short-term performance is not helpful in assessing a firm’s operational 
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security with respect to sustainable performance and profitability. The same report also argues 
that long-term strategic health metrics can be hard to identify and thus should be more qualitative 
in nature, such as a firm’s progress toward the penetration of a new market (Dobbs & Koller, 
2005). Additionally, long-term planning horizons are difficult to determine and defend. Instead, 
The McKinsey Quarterly suggests establishing and monitoring medium-term metrics, specifically 
those focused on asset health (e.g., ROA) and cost management (e.g., profit margin), which 
provide a forward-looking indication of whether a firm will be able to maintain and exceed its 
rate of growth over the next one to five years.   
I.3 Contribution to the Business Community 
As described above, the prevailing research has studied the relationship between the 
inclusion of either women or minorities on corporate boards and firm financial performance. 
Additionally, of the studies that have combined gender and ethnicity in one analysis, only one 
provided an analysis of minority women, specifically. A targeted examination highlighting the 
relationship between minority women directors and firm financial growth may provide 
actionable results for growth-oriented firms.  
Furthermore, adding minority women into corporate boardrooms leads to improved 
career opportunities for this group of people. As corporations increase their diversity hiring 
practices at the director level, these directors, who themselves are likely to mentor others like 
themselves in preparation for similar roles (Hillman, 2015), may also begin to nominate other 
minorities for these roles as well, providing still another stepping stone towards increasing the 
balance of gender and ethnicity in corporate boardrooms. These increased opportunities take on 
added significance when the regressive hiring trends that persist to the present day are taken into 
account, particularly in regard to the disproportionately low number of board seats for minority 
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women. According to the Direct Women Board Institute, a non-profit organization that facilitates 
board diversity through the endorsement of qualified women attorneys to serve as board 
nominees:  
Women of color appear to have experienced more significant impediments to their 
success on corporate boards than either white women or men of color.… This 
phenomenon may significantly undermine African Americans' board progress, and 
perhaps even the progress of all groups of color since African Americans represent the 
largest portion of people of color serving on corporate boards, not only because African 
American women significantly outnumber African American men within the student 
population, but also because African American women have come to outnumber their 
male counterparts within the labor force more generally. This pattern distinguishes 
African Americans from whites and all other racial groups in areas in which men 
continue to outnumber women (Fairfax, 2005, p. 1106).  
Beyond this, changes in board composition could have far-reaching effects on the firm’s strategic 
management. Thus, corporations that utilize this research may be guided by the evidence to 
increase minority and/or minority women participation on their boards and thereby improve 
financial performance over the medium-term. Introducing different perspectives into the 
boardroom potentially widens the range of operational strategies from which to choose, and with 
this wider selection comes an increased opportunity for success in the form of financial growth.  
I.4 Background and Justification 
Corporate governance has become a hot-button issue of late. The propagation of social 
inequality issues (covered in the previous sections) has spawned calls for the injection of 
diversity into the boardroom. In addition,, high-profile corporate scandals centered on fraud and 
embezzlement have shed light on the importance of adequate corporate oversight. Likewise, the 
collapse of several international economies during the 2008 global financial crisis has prompted 
regulatory agencies to reform corporate governance policies worldwide. At the center of each of 
these issues is a piercing public outcry for increased surveillance of the corporate landscape. In 
this respect, corporate boards offer a conciliatory solution between markets and government for 
  
10 
the purpose of corporate oversight (Pargendler, 2016). Some studies advocate that greater board 
diversity leads to reduced corporate corruption and business failure. For instance, one particular 
study found that firms with a higher percentage of women directors experience fewer 
occurrences of bribery, fraud, and corruption. This study also found that firms with homogenous 
board memberships suffer from an increased rate of governance-related scandals (Skroupa, 
2016).  
Among the most widely publicized corporate scandals in recent years were Enron’s 
fraudulent accounting practices, which cost shareholders over $74 billion in 2001, and 
WorldCom’s $11 billion in inflated assets, which resulted in $80 billion in losses for investors 
and the loss of 30,000 jobs in 2002. Other noteworthy scandals that shocked the nation included 
the misstatement of earnings by federally-backed mortgage financing giants Freddie Mac and 
Fannie Mae by more than $10 billion in 2003 and 2004 as well as Tyco CEO’s 2005 conviction 
of embezzling $500 million in company funds. In 2008, the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers 
global financing firm rocked the financial services industry after executives were discovered 
hiding more than $50 billion in loans disguised as sales. This represented the largest bankruptcy 
in U.S. history. More recently, however, Volkswagen’s market capitalization plummeted $20 
billion in 2015 after executives revealed they had incorporated elaborate software in cars to 
circumvent pollution laws. In light of these egregious offenses, both the academic and business 
communities agree that an effective corporate board, functioning as the supreme internal 
overseer, is the foundation of a successful corporation. Furthermore, board diversity has been 
found to contribute greatly to a board’s effectiveness in this role (Mehrotra, 2016), and thus, 
worldwide, laws have been passed that attempt to mandate diversity in corporate governance. 
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One such law enacted in Norway in 2003 requires every publicly-listed to be comprised 
of at least 40% women directors. The penalty for failure to comply with this mandate de-listing 
from the country’s stock exchanges. By 2008, all the country’s public firms had met this quota, 
and other countries in Europe, including Spain, Iceland, and France, had followed suit. More 
recently in 2013, the European Parliament passed a proposal requiring publicly-listed companies 
to achieve a 40% quota of non-executive women board members by 2020. In 2015, Germany 
passed a 30% quota (Isidro and Sobral, 2015). Also in 2015, the Securities and Exchange Board 
of India fined 790 companies listed on the Bombay Stock Exchange and the National Stock 
Exchange for failure to achieve a mandate of including at least one female director by April 1st 
(Bhalla, 2015). In the U.S., proposals have been presented by lawmakers in an effort to mirror 
the success of these international regulations, though conspicuously in non-binding plans and 
without penalties for failure to do so. The latest U.S. example of this legislation type was a 
preliminary draft submitted in early 2016 by Rep. Carolyn B. Maloney of the New York House 
of Representatives that would have required companies to share information about their board’s 
compositions in their proxy statements, disclose gender diversity policies and strategies to 
comply with gender equality requirements where necessary, and explain any failures in 
compliance. This was preceded by the 2015 presentation of a non-binding resolution by Rep. 
Don Beyer of Virginia asking corporations to commit to balancing gender diversity. Similar 
resolutions were also presented in California, Illinois, Massachusetts, Philadelphia, and New 
York. All of these rules have come after the implementation of a statute by the U.S. Securities 
and Exchange Commission in 2010 requiring corporations to communicate details of their 
diversity policies and the results of those policies as they relate to the nomination of board 
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directors. Yet, even the SEC statute has been regarded as a diluted version of successful 
European legislation in this area (McGregor, 2016).  
Nevertheless, to this point, no American legislative proposals have explicitly compelled 
organizations to increase the proportion of minorities, in general, or of minority women, in 
particular, in corporate boardrooms, a surprising failure given the statistical trends in the 
American labor force. According to U.S. Department of Labor statistics, in 2005, women 
represented 46% of the country’s workforce and accounted for 43% of management jobs (Chao 
& Rones, 2006), but only 15% of the board seats in Fortune 500 companies (“2005 Catalyst 
Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500”, 2006). After 10 years, in 2015, the share 
of women in the labor force had increased by only half a percentage point, with the number of 
women in management positions increasing slightly more at 1% (“Women in the Labor Force”, 
2015). However, from 2005 to 2015, the number of boardroom seats ascribed to women rose by 
five percentage points to 20% (“2015 Catalyst Census: Women and Men Board Directors”, 
2016).  
Although these numbers represent positive advances for women in general, the data on 
minority women in particular is in stark contrast. In 2015, minority women accounted for a mere 
3.1% of boardroom seats and only one-fifth of women directors overall. This compares to 3.4% 
of boardroom seats in 2005, a decrease of almost half a percentage point. To underscore this 
issue, in 2015, 85% of public corporations had no minority representation at all on their boards, 
be it man or woman (“2005 Catalyst Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500”, 
2006; “2015 Catalyst Census: Women and Men Board Directors”, 2016). 
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II LITERATURE REVIEW 
Much of the extant research investigating the effects of board composition on firm 
financial performance has been based on agency theory (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) or a 
resource-based view of the firm (Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978). However, the current research 
was grounded in upper echelons theory, a more recent theoretical framework that is more explicit 
in its interpretation of the role and potential influence of a corporation’s board of directors, and 
the conversion theory of minority influence. For comparative purposes, a brief summary of the 
previous two theories is presented in the paragraphs below, and then in-depth summaries of 
upper echelons and minority influence theories are provided in the following sections.  
Widely regarded as the prevailing theoretical point of view in the field of corporate 
governance (Daily & Cannella, 2003), agency theory addresses the problems with the ownership 
structure of American corporations as they relate to the self-interested manager and the 
disengaged shareholder. In short, an agency problem exists when a principal delegates a task to 
an agent, who then acts on their behalf. In this case, a corporation’s owners or shareholders 
delegate its day-to-day operational management to the firm’s management team, and a dilemma 
can emerge wherein the interests of the principal and agent may not align even though they are 
ostensibly working toward the same objective (Jensen & Meckling, 1976). For example, inherent 
in the job description of corporate manager is the goal of increasing firm value, which is in the 
best interest of the shareholder. However, in some situations, a manager must use his or her 
discretion, as in choosing between either a risky project that could increase the value of the firm 
or an alternative that could increase firm costs but would also ensure the manager’s job security. 
This conflict of interest incentivizes the manager to choose the alternative that reduces the value 
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of the firm. A potential solution to the agency problem is empowering a board of directors to 
guide and monitor the firm’s management team (Mehrotra, 2016).  
However, instead of focusing on internal conflicts that could unsettle the operations of a 
firm, resource dependency theory, or RDT, focuses on how a firm’s external resources can affect 
its operations. This theory argues that resources from an organization’s external environment are 
the basis of the organization’s power and are thus the source of its marketplace dominance 
(Pfeffer and Salancick, 1978). RDT views a firm’s board of directors as primarily providing a 
linkage to its environment and such resources within this environment as information, access to 
capital, and legitimacy in the eyes of competitors and customers. Since contributions by a board 
of directors render the organization less dependent on the resources in the organization’s external 
environment, increased diversity within the board of directors and decreased organizational 
dependency on its environment are positively correlated.   
Although agency theory and resource dependency theory are certainly relevant to director 
roles and influence, upper echelons theory (Hambrick and Mason, 1984) delves more deeply into 
the various ways a director’s personal characteristics can impact a firm’s operations. For this 
reason, this study focused on upper echelons theory and the conversion theory of minority 
influence (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969) as its key theoretical bases. The following 
sections provide an overview of these theoretical frameworks. 
II.1 Upper Echelons Theory 
Upper echelons theory, published in 1984, asserts that organizations can act as mirrors of 
their own senior executives (e.g., the CEO, top management team, and board of directors), since 
these leaders are responsible for formulating the policies and objectives enacted by its 
employees. This theory is based on the premise of bounded rationality (Cyert & March, 1963), 
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which asserts that a manager’s already complex reality is further complicated by the limitless 
amounts of data available. Inherent in this fountain of constantly-flowing data are constraints 
related to time, resources, and the manager’s own cognitive capacity, which effectively limit the 
manager’s ability to accurately interpret all of the data presented. Similarly, upper echelons 
theory focuses on the person or persons with decision-making authority, in particular, the 
idiosyncrasies and biases of these individuals that could affect corporate outcomes:  
If we want to understand why organizations do the things they do, or why they perform the way 
they do, we must consider the biases and dispositions of their most powerful actors—their top 
executives (Hambrick, 2007).   
Specifically, Hambrick and Mason (1984) argue that the outcomes of corporate strategy 
should be regarded as reflections of the personal values and cognitive foundations of those 
within the organization that are endowed with the highest decision-making authority, frequently 
referred to as the organization’s top management team, or TMT. A firm’s board of directors, 
serving as part of the TMT, selects and monitors the performance of the executive management 
team to ensure regulatory compliance, stockholder profit, and customer satisfaction (Aziri, 
2014).  
Figure 3 below shows the conceptual framework of upper echelons theory, in which 
directors make decisions and provide management advice based on their personal interpretations 
of strategic choices based on their experiences, values, and personalities. This theoretical model 
asserts a direct link between director characteristics and organizational outcomes. However, 
because such characteristics as cognitive frames, personal values, and individual perceptions are 
challenging to quantify, standardize, and validate, this theory requires the usage of observable 
character traits, such as demographic information (age, educational background, ethnicity, 
gender, and prior work experiences), as a basis for these theoretical connections. Consequently, 
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as shown in Figure 3, the characteristics of senior executives can become predictors of 
organizational outcomes. 
  
Figure 3: The Key Tenets of Upper Echelons Theory. 
Individual values have been defined as basic human goals that are directly related to 
specific social interactions (Schwartz, 2006). Based on this definition and in line with the basic 
premise of upper echelons theory, the values of corporate directors may vary based on their own 
histories of social interactions, particularly, their corporate leadership experiences. For instance, 
executives with an abundance of experience at the CEO level within a particular industry or firm 
may make decisions based on this experience, since it will have influenced their own cognitions 
or their values. For instance, Hillman, Cannella, and Harris found that 81% of the directors of 
large corporations had previously been either CEOs, COOs, or some other type of executive 
officer of a large corporation prior to their tenures as corporate directors (2002). However, as 
reported by the 2005 Catalyst Census of Women Board Directors of the Fortune 500, women and 
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minorities are significantly less likely to possess this type of professional experience than are 
white men (2006). Because of the wide differences in experiences of white male and minority 
board directors, increasing board-member diversity with respect to executive background should 
also increase the range of experiences and diversity in values within the board of directors as a 
whole. Because executive decisions are based on the prior experiences and values which the 
board as a whole represents, increasing board-member diversity should contribute to an 
increased breadth of strategic options for the firm.  
Research conducted in support of upper echelons theory has unearthed several notable 
findings, which Hambrick summarized in his 2007 theory update. Boeker (1997), D’Aveni 
(1990), and Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven (1990) have validated the theoretical assumption that 
demographics can function as surrogates for the cognitive frames of executives. This assumption 
aligns with my hypothesis that when directors of different ethnicities and genders are included in 
a firm’s board of directors, different firm-level financial outcomes may occur. Crossland and 
Hambrick (2007) and Finklestein and Hambrick (1990) delved further into possible drivers for 
this phenomenon and gathered strong empirical evidence in support of a pivotal moderator for 
predictions based on upper echelons theory: managerial discretion. Stated succinctly, when a 
sufficient amount of managerial discretion (the level of sovereignty that is offered to executives 
in the decision-making process) is present, organizational managers are expected to leave greater 
traces of their personal characteristics on organizational outcomes. Because corporate directors 
are commonly perceived as being endowed with ample amounts of latitude in their decisions 
related to organizational strategy, this finding satisfactorily aligns with the current research. 
Hambrick’s research has also shown that the characteristics of top management teams and the 
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balance of group heterogeneity are better indicators of performance than a director’s personal 
perspectives (Hambrick, 2007). This point of view underpins the current research.  
II.2 Conversion Theory of Minority Influence 
The other theory upon which the current research is based is conversion theory of 
minority influence, which provides a means of analyzing the processes that occur when a 
minority opinion-holder is able to interrupt the thought processes and change the decisions of 
members of the majority-opinion group (Moscovici, Lage, & Naffrechoux, 1969). The 1969 
experiment by these researchers assumed a perspective in opposition to the ‘conformity bias’ of 
prevailing social-influence theories. At the time of this seminal study, most of the field was 
focused on the processes by which majority opinion-holders influence conforming behaviors 
amongst all group members, including those holding a minority opinion. On the contrary, using 
verbal and non-verbal responses, this study revealed that, particularly among the women 
included in the experiment, a minority opinion-holder can wield considerable influence over a 
majority opinion-holder.  
However, the minority opinion-holder must be able to demonstrate consistency 
throughout the decision-making process in order for this effect to occur. Consistency, defined as 
repetition of response, was perceived by the majority as loyalty to a position on an issue when 
presented alongside a clear and explicit statement of the position. The majority group’s 
perception of loyalty, reinforced by the certainty and confidence presented by the minority 
opinion-holder is what eventually leads to the conversion of the majority decision to the minority 
opinion. Notwithstanding, Nemeth, Swedlund, and Kanki (1974) found that minority opinions 
could still stir divergent thinking within groups when a lack of consistency is present, as long as 
some sort of a pattern within the divergent thinking is evident. For example, within a board of 
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directors, a pattern could consist of one director tending to promote environmentally-focused 
cost-savings projects or of another director frequently suggesting the addition of technology-
focused revenue streams. In the absence of consistency, the majority must also be convinced that 
the minority opinion-holder is firmly committed to his or her beliefs. Thus, casually repeating the 
same idea a few times will not have the same effect. Furthermore, a lack of consistency was 
often deemed favorable by majority opinion-holders as it resulted in a perception of flexibility 
and thus still led to conversion of the majority opinion-holders to the minority opinion.  
Moreover, a key difference in minority and majority influence is related to the depth of 
the conversion. When majority-opinion group members are thought to influence conformity 
amongst minority group members, conforming behavior is believed to be due primarily to the 
effect of public perception. These minority-opinion group members have been found to continue 
to object to the majority opinion but only in private. However, when minority-opinion group 
members are thought to influence changes in the opinions of the majority, it is believed to be 
done privately at first, with these group members questioning their own beliefs, but then in turn 
questioning the beliefs and actions of the group as a whole (Moscovici, et. al., 1969; Nemeth, et. 
al., 1974). When minority-opinion group members influence change, it is believed to be done 
more intimately and permanently than when it happens the other way around. Thus, in line with 
this theory, when a woman or a minority is added to a previously homogenous boardroom, 
changes in the pattern of strategic decisions, and essentially, changes in organizational 
performance, may begin to occur. 
In an attempt to explain the effects of minority influence, research has emerged from 
either of two key theoretical streams: 1) the minimization of minority influence by the majority 
and 2) the conversion of the majority to the minority opinion (Bazarova, Walther, & McLeod, 
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2012). Some branches of the first stream of research, which includes the black sheep effect 
(Marques, Abrams, & Serodio, 2001), the aversion of the double minority (Maass, Clark & 
Haberkorn, 1982), and tokenism (Kanter, 1977), argue that, when disagreements occur within a 
group, the majority group may take steps to limit any possible influence by minority opinion-
holders by discounting and/or disregarding their deviant opinions. Though the expected 
outcomes of the current research are not aligned to this particular stream of research, they may 
be relevant to the outcomes of prior studies that have found either no significant relationship or 
significant negative relationships between board diversity and firm financial performance.  
The black sheep effect argues that members of the minority-opinion group whose views 
deviate from the majority will be discredited and devalued if the minority-opinion group member 
is deemed substantially different from the majority in another key respect (Marques, Abrams, & 
Serodio, 2001). For example, if a woman director’s opinion differs from that of the majority of a 
corporate board made up mostly of men, then the majority may dismiss the difference in 
opinions as based on gender-based differences in thinking.  
Likewise, the opinions of a double minority or a minority-opinion group member who is 
also viewed as an outsider of the majority-opinion group’s social circle will also be dismissed if 
the majority-opinion group believes that this social difference can explain the minority-opinion-
holder’s conflicting position (Bazarova, et. al., 2012). For example, if the majority of the 
corporate board is made up mostly of white directors with upper-middle-class upbringings and a 
minority opinion is raised by a black director having a lower-class upbringing, then the majority 
may disregard the minority opinion as incorrect and untrustworthy because it is inconsistent with 
that of directors who are perceived as more likely to think properly about the issue.  
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A similar rejection will also occur when the minority opinion-holder is believed to be the 
subject of tokenism (Kanter, 1977). In cases of tokenism, deviants who differ not only by 
opinion but also in regard to another important dimension may be viewed as a rare instance of 
this particular dimension. Thus, tokens come to symbolize this important difference on a grand 
scale.  
Tokens can never be just another member while their category is so rare; they will always 
be a hyphenated member, as in “woman-engineer” or “male-nurse” or “black-physician” 
(Kanter, 1977, p. 968).  
For the reasons that Kanter astutely describes above, in the case of tokenism, the minority 
opinion is completely overlooked, and token group members are not allowed to fully participate 
in the decision-making process because their inclusion in the group is viewed only as symbolic 
in nature.  
Conversely, the second stream of research within the realm of minority influence is 
focused on the conversion of the majority to the minority opinion. Highlighted by three key 
theories—the mediating influence of the double minority (Maass, et. al., 1982), the minority 
leniency contract model (Crano, 2001), and congruence (Newcomb, 1961), this stream of 
research argues that in times of group disagreement, the majority may reexamine issues from the 
minority’s viewpoint and ultimately convert to the latter’s way of thinking in conformity with the 
minority. This is the stance that I adopted in the analytical approach for the current research.  
Although the opinions of a double minority may often be categorically rejected by the 
majority group for reasons described in prior paragraphs, the opposite effect can also occur. 
Double minorities have often been perceived as more competent when the opinions that they 
advocate are directly related to their minority standing (Maass, et. al., 1982). For example, a 
Mexican-American doctor on the board of a large hospital is likely to sway the rest of the board 
towards healthcare initiatives that focus on outreach activities in the Latino community. In this 
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case, the board may believe that the Mexican-American doctor knows more about projects within 
that community because he himself is Latino.  
Similarly, the minority leniency contract model states that majority opinion-holders will 
yield to minority opinion-holders when minority opinions diverge only slightly from the majority 
(Crano, 2001). Instead of ignoring the minority opinion and branding the minority opinion-
holder as an outcast, as described in the summary of the prior stream of research, the mild 
deviation from the majority opinion prompts the majority to pursue a justifiable reason for the 
group member’s divergent beliefs. For example, if a board member presents a slightly tweaked 
alternative of a strategic resource allocation decision, it is more likely to gain traction with the 
majority than if a more radical approach were presented. The slight inconsistency of opinions 
within the group triggers apprehension in the majority and promotes a reconsideration of the 
mainstream opinion as compared to the rationale of the opposing opinion, thereby increasing the 
time spent on deliberation and the possibility of conversion to the minority opinion.  
Similarly, congruence occurs when group members assume that others similar to 
themselves in regard to their attitudes on values, sex, religion, and ethnicity will hold opinions 
that are akin to their own and that those with different attitudes will hold different opinions as 
well (Newcomb, 1961). In the group decision-making process, differing opinions that are 
congruent with these expectations related to the internal composition of the group help cultivate 
the conversion of the majority group more easily than when differences of opinions are 
incongruent with these expectations (Bazarova, et. al., 2012). For example, a corporate board 
with a majority of white directors may be presented with diverging ideas from its ethnic minority 
directors as well as another set of contrasting opinions from a small group of white directors. In 
this case, the board as a whole may be more receptive to the ideas from its ethnic minority 
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directors because differences are more likely to be expected from that group of directors. In 
general, group members appear to be influenced more by conflicting opinions from those who 
are unlike themselves, and at the same time, less responsive to conflicting opinions when these 
are brought forth by those who are similar to themselves.  
I believe that the concept of congruence as it relates to the conversion theory of minority 
influence may help explain the results of this study. Specifically, when women and ethnic 
minorities are included in corporate boards, the other members of the board may be more 
inclined to alter the board’s strategic decisions because they expect divergence from these 
groups. Moreover, the subsequent alterations in corporate strategy may have a positive effect on 
corporate financial growth.  
II.3 Synthesis of Literature on Gender Diversity  
Compared to other demographic diversity factors, gender diversity seems to be the area 
that is most researched within the academic literature (Darmadi, 2013). Between the 1950s and 
the 1980s, literature on gender diversity in corporate boardrooms focused mainly on the reasons 
for the lack of diversity within this area as well as detailed descriptions of the gender dynamics 
within these boardrooms. Fuller and Batchelder launched this wave of literature in 1953. 
Through interviews of 175 people (including 47 women) within 95 organizations across 17 
industries and spanning nine major metropolitan cities across the North, South, and Midwestern 
regions of the United States, the researchers found that very few women in any industry held 
senior level executive positions and, of those who were employed in executive positions, many 
typically had been with the company for an extensive number of years or since the start of the 
business. They also found that many women who made it to the top ranks of an organization end 
up serving as assistants to the male executives who led the firm’s operations. 
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Throughout the 1960s, the major focus of the research in this field was on the different 
characteristics of women in these executive offices and the potential reasons that very few 
women occupied these positions. In the ‘60s, authors such as Powell (1963), Famularo (1967), 
Buchanan (1968), and Merritt (1969), pointed to antiquated business traditions and society’s 
archetypal predilections as the reasons for the lack of progress in integrating women into 
executive management teams. At the same time, Wilensky (1968) noted that although the 
number of women in professional positions had increased over time, the percentage of women in 
these positions had either slipped, remained stable, or increased only minimally over the same 
period, citing women’s reduced participation in higher education versus men’s and their 
increased propensity to resign their own ambitions in support of their husband or children.  
In 1975, Business and Society Review began publishing what is believed to be the first 
comprehensive list of women corporate directors, noting that many companies shared the same 
directors. This inter-firm pooling of directors was noted as diluting the true and absolute number 
of women granted board appointments (Orr, 1977). In 1980, Schwartz published an influential 
study on women directors, revealing that only 1.8% of directors of Fortune 1,300 companies 
were women at that time. As the founder of Catalyst, her publication of this study was an initial 
iteration of the now-annual census of women on the top management teams and corporate boards 
of the largest U.S. firms. Schwartz also noted that almost none of those women had ever served 
as a chief executive of a major corporation or on any other corporate board, unlike their male 
counterparts, for whom those experiences were typical. 
From the 1990s to the present, researchers have focused on the link between gender 
differences in the boardroom and strategic outcomes. During this period, the topic of research 
shifted from the descriptions of women in these senior positions to the qualitative effects that the 
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infusion of women into these positions has generated within the organizations under their 
influence. For instance, women are more likely to select less risky or aggressive organizational 
strategies than their male counterparts (Joecks, Pull, & Vetter, 2013). Additionally, women are 
also more inclined than men to invest organizational resources in more environmentally-
sustainable projects (Darmadi, 2013).  Reduced claims of sexual harassment and increased 
awareness of social performance are other phenomena noted in organizations with women on 
their corporate boards (Singh Kang & Payal, 2012).  
The presence of women directors is also associated with increased ethical and social 
compliance (Isidro & Sobral, 2015) and increased allocation of resources for corporate 
monitoring activities (Kakabadse et al., 2015), thereby strengthening the independence of the 
board. Finally, Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, and Veolpel (2015) noted that, when women are 
enlisted in the role of corporate directors, they are more likely to advance creative and 
cooperative decision-making tactics during strategy discussions whereas their male counterparts 
were more likely to suggest tactics based on past precedent, policy, and regulations during these 
types of deliberations. In the negative, some researchers have observed that the introduction of 
women to boards may add communication difficulties and interpersonal tension that could stall 
the decision-making process (Darmadi, 2013; Hassan, Marimuthu, & Johl, 2015; Kakabadse et. 
al., 2015; Pletzer et al., 2015).  
Thus, evidence is mixed on the relationship between women directors have and corporate 
financial performance. Some recent studies suggest that the presence of women on corporate 
boards exert a positive influence on financial results, and the findings of these studies are 
presented in detail below. 
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To examine the relationship between gender diversity on corporate boards and firm 
financial performance as measured by return on assets (ROA), Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, and 
Simpson (2010) examined the relationship between both gender and ethnic diversity within 
corporate boards and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q as well as performance as measured 
by ROA. Included in this study were 641 companies on the S&P 500 from 1998 to 2002. 
Findings indicated a positive relationship between ROA and firm performance. A similar study 
was done by Julizaerma and Sori (2012), who evaluated 274 Malaysian firms listed on the ACE 
stock market during the years 2008 and 2009. The results of this study also showed a positive 
relationship between the presence of women on corporate boards and firm performance as 
measured by ROA.  
Joecks, Pull, and Vetter (2013) studied the relationship between gender diversity within 
corporate boards and firm financial performance. After examining the ROE of 151 German 
companies between the years 2000 and 2005, the researchers found a positive relationship 
between gender diversity within the boards of directors and firm financial performance.  
Liu, Wei, and Xie (2013) researched the relationship between gender diversity in 
corporate boards and firm performance as measured by ROA and return on sales (ROS). The 
study included over 2,000 companies listed on China's stock exchanges from 1999 to 2011. The 
researchers found a positive relationship between gender diversity and both performance 
indicators, and, moreover, the strength of this relationship increased as the number of women 
directors increased from one or two to three or more.  
Nguyen, Locke, and Reddy (2015) also investigated the relationship between gender 
diversity and firm value. Analyzing the Tobin’s Q of 120 publicly listed companies in Vietnam 
between 2008 to 2011, the researchers found a positive relationship between the number of 
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women directors and firm value. Findings also indicated that the more women that were included 
on the board, the more statistically significant the relationship. However, this marginal effect was 
not present in boards with over 20% women membership.  
Isidro and Sobral (2015) examined the relationship between gender diversity on corporate 
boards and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q as well as firm performance as measured by 
ROA and ROS. The study focused on 922 large firms in 16 European countries between 2010 
and 2012. Though the researchers found no relationship between the number of women on the 
board and firm value, they did, however, find a positive relationship between gender diversity 
and both ROA and ROS.  
Ntim (2015) analyzed the relationship between both ethnic and gender diversity within 
corporate boards and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. The researchers examined 169 firms 
in South Africa from 2002 to 2007. The study findings indicated a positive relationship between 
gender diversity within the board of directors and firm value.   
Garcia-Meca et al. (2015) studied the relationship between both gender and ethnic 
diversity within corporate boards and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q as well as financial 
performance as measured by ROA. Analyzing 159 banks in nine countries in Europe and the 
Western Hemisphere from 2004 to 2010, the researchers found a positive relationship between 
gender diversity within the board of directors and both firm value and financial performance.  
To the contrary, however, other studies found either little or no relationship between firm 
financial performance and board gender diversity. For example, the study of Isidro and Sobral 
(2015) on gender diversity on corporate boards and firm financial performance (also mentioned 
above) found no relationship between the number of women on the board and firm value, as 
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measured by Tobin’s Q. Details on the findings of other recent studies showing either minimal or 
negative results are presented below. 
As mentioned previously, Carter, et. al., (2010) examined the relationship between both 
gender and ethnic diversity within corporate boards and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q. 
The findings of this study indicated no relationship between either gender or ethnic diversity and 
firm value. Mehrotra (2016) investigated 100 companies on the NYSE from 2008 to 2013 and 
also found no relationship between gender diversity and firm financial performance as measured 
by ROA. Lastly, Dale-Olson, Schone, and Verner’s (2013) study, which used panel data for the 
years 2002 through 2009 for 128 public Norwegian firms to explore the relationship between 
gender diversity and ROA, yielded comparable results.  
Conversely, Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu, and Nwakoby’s (2012) study of the relationship 
between both ethnic and gender diversity of 122 firms in Nigeria between 1991 and 2008 found a 
negative relationship between gender diversity within the board of directors and ROA. Similarly, 
Darmadi (2013) also found a negative relationship for both firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q 
and firm performance as measured by ROA. These results covered 354 firms listed on the 
Indonesia Stock Exchange during the year 2007.  
Analyzing 318 Dutch pension funds for three unspecified consecutive years, Veltrop, 
Hermes, Postma, and Haan (2015) analyzed the relationship between gender diversity within 
corporate boards and financial performance as measured by return on investment (ROI). The 
results of this analysis indicated a negative relationship between gender diversity within the 
board of directors and financial performance.  
In an attempt to reconcile these mixed findings within the academic literature on the 
relationship between gender diversity in corporate boardrooms and firm financial performance, I 
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also reviewed two meta-analyses on this subject. Pletzer, Nikolova, Kedzior, and Voelpel (2015) 
completed a meta-analysis of 20 studies that found no relationship between board gender 
diversity and financial performance as measured by ROA and ROE. On the other hand, Post and 
Byron’s 2015 meta-analysis of 140 prior studies identified a positive relationship between 
number of women on a board of directors and firm ROA, ROE, and return on invested capital 
(ROIC). However, as this study also noted, these findings were dependent on a critical mass of at 
least three women directors being present and was much less pronounced in organizations with 
just one or two women directors. However, Post and Byron acknowledged that these results were 
based on only one socio-cultural factor (i.e., gender) and that more research was needed to assess 
the relevance or extent of other socio-cultural factors (e.g., ethnicity).  
II.4 Synthesis of Literature on Ethnic Diversity  
Although the literature on gender diversity on corporate boards is vast, the same cannot 
be said for academic research in the field of ethnic diversity in corporate governance. Some 
studies that focus on gender diversity also include ethnic diversity with other diversity types of 
equal importance, including age, education, functional expertise, and culture. However, not 
many studies focus on ethnicity alone. While gender diversity is a critical diversity factor, other 
demographic attributes should also be considered in the discussion of boardroom integration, 
including ethnicity, which is defined as the collective impact of a person’s race and cultural 
background (Adams, Haan, Terjesen & Ees, 2015).  
While correlational research is lacking, some descriptive statistical research is available 
in the field of ethnic board diversity. As mentioned previously, 81% of corporate directors in the 
United States are former chief executives of other large firms (Hillman, et. al., 2002). However, 
considering the historical discrimination practices within the U.S. as it relates to occupational 
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opportunities for minority citizens (also mentioned in previous sections), minorities make up a 
negligible number of the directors following that career path. Furthermore, women as a whole 
currently represent 20% of board members within the United States. However, African-
Americans make up only 7% of board members (even though this racial group represents 13% of 
the U.S. population); and Hispanics make up only 3% (even though they represent 17% of the 
population). These figures highlight the proportional disparities in the numbers of minorities that 
are elevated to corporate boardrooms. Furthermore, 35% more companies have at least one 
woman director than have at least one African-American board member, which is the minority 
group having the largest board representation (Peterson, Philpot, & O’Shaughnessy, 2007). 
Correspondingly, minorities are also significantly underrepresented in the leadership of corporate 
boards (Murphy, 2015), and a meaningful solution to this diversity problem within executive 
leadership cannot continue to be simply adding a lone white woman to numerous (and sometimes 
interlocking) board memberships of various companies. 
The empirical results of ethnic diversity in corporate boards have been meagerly 
documented. Hillman (2015) reported that minorities who occupy the roles of senior executives 
within an organization are more likely to mentor others within the organization, which not only 
generates a more productive workforce but also allows for a steady stream of qualified minorities 
for potential promotion to the director role. Upadhyay and Zeng (2014) found that increased 
ethnic diversity also increases quantity and quality of the information available on the company’s 
internal governance systems. Without specifically mentioning ethnicity, research by Carter et al. 
(2010) cautioned that increased boardroom diversity can generate intrapersonal conflicts that 
may outweigh any of the perceived positive outcomes. However, Kong-Hee and Rasheed (2014) 
proposed that infusing directors with diverse backgrounds into corporate boardrooms could 
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enable improved identification and assessment of strategic opportunities across a range of 
industry groups.  
However, of the empirical research on corporate financial performance, results are mixed 
regarding the performance of companies with racially diverse boards. Even though Carter et al. 
(2010) found no correlation between ethnicity and financial performance, Ujunwa, Okoyeuzu, 
and Nwakoby’s study (2012), found that there is a positive relationship between ethnic diversity 
within the board of directors and firm financial performance as measured by ROA. Similarly, 
Ntim’s study on ethnic and gender diversity (2015), also mentioned in the previous section, 
found a positive relationship between ethnic diversity (by way of nationality) and firm value as 
measured by Tobin’s Q. More significantly, however, this study also found a more positive 
relationship between ethnic diversity (rather than gender diversity) and stock value. 
Alternatively, in Garcia-Meca et al.’s (2015) study of the relationship between both 
gender and ethnic diversity, which is also mentioned previously, a negative relationship found 
between the ethnicity of board directors and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q as well as 
financial performance as measured by ROA. Similarly, a 2016 study by Frijns, Dodd, and 
Cimerova found a significant negative relationship between ethnic diversity and firm value after 
evaluating the Tobin’s Q and ROA of 243 British firms between 2002 and 2014. Despite these 
mixed findings and considering the amplified growth in the minority population projected to 
occur over the next thirty years, recruiting board representatives who will enhance community 
ties, approval, and potential market offerings may be crucial for the vitality of growth-oriented 
organizations (Pechersky, 2016), as this may, in fact, improve financial performance over time. 
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II.5 Synthesis of Literature on Minority Women  
In spite of the push from intersectional theorists who argue that ethnicity and gender 
should be studied in conjunction, almost no academic literature is dedicated to the subject 
(Peterson et al., 2007). Orr (1977) noted that, in 1977, 340 of America’s top 1,300 corporations 
had women directors, while only 100 had black directors. Orr also observed that, relative to their 
aggregate population numbers, both African-Americans and women continue to be grossly 
under-represented on corporate boards. Hillman, Cannella, and Harris (2002) noted that 75% of 
African-American women in the position of corporate director held advanced degrees in 
comparison to 51% of white male directors. Of this same group, 56% of African-American 
women held doctoral degrees as opposed to 19% of white men. Because of the increased level of 
formal education and reduced amount of executive level experience possessed by minority 
women directors versus white men, corporate boards that add minority women directors are more 
likely to consider strategic alternatives that have some basis in academic concepts in addition to 
alternatives based on past business experiences. Even though a small number of publications 
discuss African-American women on corporate boards, almost none address directors of Asian, 
Hispanic or Native American descent. Differing socio-economic backgrounds of potential 
minority board members, who typically perceive themselves as self-made or under-privileged (as 
opposed to self-perceptions of non-minority board members as middle-class or upper-class), 
these potential directors may provide divergent perspectives on the obligations that corporations 
owe other stakeholders, shareholders, and the surrounding community (Peterson et al., 2007).  
The increased range of perspectives and strategic alternatives brought into the boardroom by 
minority women directors can be beneficial for growth-oriented firms. 
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The amount of empirical research that has been published on the relationship between 
minority women directors and firm financial performance is minimal. The majority of the 
research that is available on the topic has been approached in either of the two following ways: 
1) Gender and ethnicity are lumped together into one overarching diversity group or 2) Gender 
and ethnicity are analyzed separately but as a part of the same study and may or may not include 
other demographic diversity factors such as age and education. The findings of the second 
category of research were presented in the previous section, and the results of the first category 
are provided below. 
Zahra and Stanton (1988) grouped women and minorities into one diversity category and 
found no correlation between the percentages of women and minorities on corporate boards and 
firm performance. Carter, D’Souza, Simkins, and Simpson’s investigation (2010) included a 
similar diversity grouping that combined minorities and women. The results of this study showed 
no relationship between the larger diversity group containing either gender- or ethnically-diverse 
directors and firm value as measured by Tobin’s Q or firm performance as measured by ROA.  
On the other hand, Erhardt, Werbel, and Shrader (2003) found a positive relationship 
between the percentages of women and minorities on boards and ROA and ROE. Ntim (2015), 
mentioned in both of the previous sections, also found a positive relationship between boards of 
directors containing either minority or women directors and firm value as measured by Tobin’s 
Q. Similarly, Ararat, Aksu, and Tansel Cetin (2015) examined the combined relationship 
between gender and ethnic diversity (by way of nationality) within corporate boards and 
financial performance. This study, which included 95 firms on the Bourse Istanbul stock index 
during 2006, found a positive relationship between boards having either diversity factor and both 
firm value, as measured by market-to-book ratio, and performance, as measured by ROE.  
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Only one study analyzed the relationship between of minority women and firm financial 
performance. Ntim (2015), mentioned in both of the previous sections, approached this analysis 
from multiple perspectives and provided the results of the diversity categories separately 
(presented in the previous sections), combined (as mentioned in the above paragraph), and from 
the perspective of the minority women. The study’s findings indicated that there is a positive 
relationship between the presence of minority women within the board of directors and firm 
value as measured by Tobin’s Q.  Based on the belief that the different perspectives offered by 
minority women directors can modify the high-level decision-making that occurs in the 
boardroom and thereby possibly increase financial performance, I focused my study on minority 
woman as did Ntim (2015), but within the context of companies located within the United States.   
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III HYPOTHESES 
It has been established in the literature that the structure and composition of the board of 
directors can influence firm financial performance (Aziri, 2014; Hambrick & Mason, 1984; 
Pargendler, 2016; Pintea & Fulop, 2015). Also, as mentioned previously, the current research 
focused on the five-year growth rate of the performance indicators, in line with the professional 
literature, which discourages the use of short-term performance metrics (Nooyi, 2010; Kilroy & 
Schneider, 2016) and encourages the use of medium-term metrics to ascertain the sustainability 
of operations, asset health, and profitability (Barton & Wiseman, 2015). However, the collective 
outcomes of ethnic and gender diversity in American boardrooms have not heretofore been 
studied, as demonstrated by the review of the academic literature cited in the previous sections. 
Additionally, there are conflicting reports of the relationship between each of these diversity 
types and a firm’s financial returns, as shown in Table 2 below.  
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Table 2:  Recent Studies on Firm Performance and Board Diversity  
(Gender and Ethnicity) 
 
  
CATEGORY AUTHOR(S) YEAR SAMPLE MEASURES Key Findings
ETHNICITY and GENDER 
(1 group)
Zahra, S. A. 
Stanton, W. W.
1988
100 Public Firms in US
1980
ROA, profit margin, sales 
to equity ratio, earnings 
per share, dividends
No Relationship
ETHNICITY and GENDER 
(1 group)
Erhardt, N. L. 
et. al.
2003
127 Large US Firms
1993-1998
ROA, ROI Positive Relationship
ETHNICITY or GENDER 
(2 groups)
Carter, D. A. 
et. al.
2010
641 Public Firms in US
1998-2002
ROA, Tobin's Q
Positive Relationship (ROA)
No Relationship (Tobin's Q)
GENDER
Julizaerma, M.K. 
Sori, M. Z.
2012
Public Firms in Malaysia
2008-2009
ROA Positive Relationship
ETHNICITY or GENDER 
(2 groups)
Ujunwa, A. 
et. al.
2012
122 Public Nigerian Firms
1991-2008
ROA
Positive Relationship (Ethnicity) 
Negative Relationship (Gender)
GENDER
Dale-Olsen, H.
et. al.
2013
128 PLC & LTD Firms in Norway 
2003-2007
ROA No Relationship
GENDER
Joecks, J. 
et. al.
2013
151 Public Firms in Germany 
2000-2005
ROE Positive Relationship
GENDER Darmadi, S. 2013
354 Public Firms in  Indonesia
2007
ROA, Tobin's Q Negative Relationship
GENDER
Liu, Y.  
et. al.
2014
Public Firms in China
1999-2011
ROA, ROS Positive Relationship
ETHNICITY and GENDER 
(1 group)
Ararat, M.  
et. al.
2015
95 Firms in Emerging Market 
Countries
ROE, Market to Book ratio Positive Relationship
ETHNICITY or GENDER 
(2 groups)
García-Meca, E., 
et. al.
2015
159 Banks in 9 Countries 
2004–2010
ROA, Tobin's Q
Positive Relationship (Gender) 
Negative Relationship (Ethnicity)
GENDER
Isidro, H.  
Sobral, M.
2015
922 Large Firms in Europe
2010-2012
Firm Value, ROA, ROSales Positive Relationship
GENDER
Nguyen, T.  
et. al.
2015
120 Public Firms in Vietnam 
2008-2011
Tobin's Q Positive Relationship
ETHNICITY and/or GENDER
(both 1 & 2 groups)
Ntim, C. G. 2015
169 Public Firms in South Africa
2002-2007
ROA, Tobin's Q Positive Relationship
GENDER
Post, C.
Byron, K.
2015
140 Previous Studies
90,000 firms in 35 Countries
ROA, ROE, ROIC, Tobin's Q Positive Relationship
GENDER
Veltrop, D. B. 
et. al.
2015
318 Dutch Pension Funds
3 Unspecified Years
ROI Negative Relationship
ETHNICITY
Frijns, B. 
et. al.
2016
243 British Firms
2002-2014
ROA, Tobin's Q Negative Relationship
GENDER Mehrotra, S. 2016
100 Firms Listed on NYSE
2008-2013
ROA No Relationship
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Because of this disparity, this research sought to add clarity to an overlooked area of 
research, while arguing that board diversity does in fact play a key role in a firm’s financial 
growth. The three measures of firm performance included in this study were net profit margin, 
return on assets (ROA), and return on equity (ROE). These profitability ratios show the 
collective results of strategic decisions related to liquidity, asset management, and debt position 
(Brigham & Erhardt, 2011). Additionally, these standard accounting-based ratios were the most 
commonly used measures in prior similar studies (Ararat et al., 2015; Dale-Olsen et al., 2013; 
Erhardt et al., 2003; Joecks et al., 2013; Post & Byron, 2015; Zahra & Stanton, 1988).  
For the purpose of this research, I argued that ROA was an appropriate measure for this 
analysis because one of the primary functions of the board of directors is formulating long-term 
asset allocation plans and so include capital investments in plants, land, and equipment (The 
Business Roundtable, 1978). Accordingly, ROA, which measures the profitability of a business 
relative to the total amount of all its assets, measures the effectiveness of a company’s assets in 
producing revenue, and, thus, the effectiveness of a board’s asset allocation decisions.  
Secondly, I believed ROE to be an appropriate measure for this analysis because another 
of a board’s primary functions is approving any changes to a firm’s financial structure, which 
includes retention of debt and distribution of company stock or corporate equity (Gygax, 
Hazledine, & Spencer, 2017; Pereira, Couto, & Francisco, 2015). ROE, which measures the 
profitability of a business relative to its total market value as measured by its outstanding equity, 
is an indicator of a company’s effectiveness in generating profit from the money shareholders 
have invested in the company, and, essentially, the effectiveness in a board’s capital structure 
decisions.  
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Lastly, I adopted profit margin as also an appropriate measure for this analysis because 
two other major functions of the board of directors are monitoring organizational performance 
and making strategic recommendations to improve this performance over the long-term (Barton 
& Wiseman, 2015). Such recommendations may take the form of changes to principal revenue 
streams or product lines and ensuring senior executives are effectively controlling costs. Profit 
margin reveals how much of every dollar in sales the company is able to keep in earnings after 
accounting for all expenses and, thus, in turn, reveals the board’s effectiveness in their revenue 
planning and cost control decisions.  
Notably, Tobin’s Q (market-to-book valuation ratio), another financial performance 
measure commonly used in similar studies, was not applied to this analysis. Tobin’s Q is 
calculated using the following ratio:  
Tobin’s Q =   
Market Value of Outstanding Stock 
Replacement Cost of Firm Assets
 
While determining the market value of outstanding stock is relatively simple, calculating 
an accurate estimation of the replacement costs of all the firm’s assets has proven to be difficult. 
Particularly, markets for the firm’s used equipment may not even exist. Furthermore, the value of 
intangible assets such as R&D, trademarks, and copyrights is often difficult to determine because 
of issues related to ongoing creation, volatility, and problems with protection and enforcement. 
For this reason, the value of intangible assets is often left out, leading to a proportional 
overstatement of the market value.  
To illustrate, the average Tobin’s Q of industries such as photo equipment (3.08), 
chemicals (2.40), and food products (1.70) typically exceed 1. This indicates that either most 
firms in these industries are worth far more that it would cost to rebuild the businesses from the 
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ground up, or that there is a measurement error, which is more likely considering the valuation 
issues discussed above (Carlton & Perloff, 2015).  
Furthermore, underinvestment in capital assets can artificially inﬂate Tobin’s q, which 
contradicts the assumption from previous academic literature that increased Tobin’s Q is 
indicative of better financial performance (Dybig & Marachka, 2010). One study’s findings 
provided a succinct summation of the problems related to using Tobin’s Q as a measure of firm 
value:  
It is well understood that this ratio exhibits considerable variation not only over time but 
also at any given point in time, across industries and even across firms within the same 
industry (McNichols, Rajan, & Reichelstein, 2014, p. 1394).  
For these reasons, I have excluded Tobin’s Q and included accounting returns as financial 
measures for this study. A summary of the financial measures included in my hypotheses and the 
rationale for their inclusion in the study follows.  
My hypotheses are grouped according to financial performance ratio and diversity 
category. ROA is denoted as hypothesis 1, ROE is denoted as hypothesis 2, and profit margin is 
denoted as hypothesis 3; hypotheses concerning firms that include minority women on their 
boards are categorized with A’s, those concerning firms that include minorities of either sex on 
their boards are categorized with B’s, and those concerning firms that include women, either 
minority or non-minority, on their boards are categorized with C’s.  
  
  
40 
Hypotheses A are related to minority women and express my expectation that, in line 
with upper echelons theory, the differing past experiences and personal values of minority 
women and white men will drive differences of opinions within the board on the firm’s strategic 
direction. Furthermore, I also expect that, in line with the conversion theory of minority 
influence, these minority opinions (held by the marginal number of minority women included on 
the board) will inspire variations in the strategic decisions made by firms that include minority 
women on their corporate boards versus firms that do not based on the congruence and double-
minority perspectives outlined in the previous section. For these reasons, I believe that the 
inclusion of minority women within corporate boards will have a significant positive relationship 
with the financial returns of these corporations. Thus, hypotheses A are detailed explicitly below: 
Hypothesis 1A:      The 5-year growth rates in ROA of firms with minority women on their boards 
of directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on their 
boards of directors.  
Hypothesis 2A:      The 5-year growth rates in ROE of firms with minority women on their boards 
of directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on their 
boards of directors.  
Hypothesis 3A:      The 5-year growth rates in net profit margin of firms with minority women on 
their boards of directors are greater than those of firms with only white men 
on their boards of directors.  
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Hypotheses B are related to ethnic minorities of any gender. It is my expectation that, in 
line with upper echelons theory, the differing past experiences and personal values of minorities 
and white men will drive differences of opinions within the board on the firm’s strategic 
direction. Furthermore, I also expect that, in line with the conversion theory of minority 
influence, these minority opinions (held by the marginal number of ethnic minorities included on 
the board) will inspire variations in the strategic decisions made by firms that include minorities 
on their corporate boards versus firms that do not based on the congruence and double minority 
perspectives. For these reasons, I believe that the inclusion of minorities within corporate boards 
will have a significant positive relationship with the financial returns of these corporations. Thus, 
hypotheses B are detailed explicitly below. 
Hypothesis 1B:      The 5-year growth rates in ROA of firms with minorities on their boards of 
directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on their boards 
of directors.  
Hypothesis 2B:      The 5-year growth rates in ROE of firms with minorities on their boards of 
directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on their boards 
of directors.   
Hypothesis 3B:      The 5-year growth rates in net profit margin of firms with minorities on their 
boards of directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on 
their boards of directors.   
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Hypotheses C are related to women of any ethnicity. It is my expectation that, in line with 
upper echelons theory, the differing past experiences and personal values between women and 
white men will drive differences of opinions within the board on the firm’s strategic direction. 
Furthermore, I also expect that, in line with the conversion theory of minority influence, these 
minority opinions (held by the marginal number of women included on the board) will inspire 
variations in the strategic decisions made by firms that include women on their corporate boards 
versus firms that do not based on the minority leniency contract model. For these reasons, I 
believe that the inclusion of women within corporate boards will have a significant positive 
relationship with the financial returns of these corporations. Thus, hypotheses C are detailed 
explicitly below. 
Hypothesis 1C:      The 5-year growth rates in ROA of firms with women on their boards of 
directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on their boards 
of directors.  
Hypothesis 2C:      The 5-year growth rates in ROE of firms with women on their boards of 
directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on their boards 
of directors.   
Hypothesis 3C:      The 5-year growth rates in net profit margin of firms with women on their 
boards of directors are greater than those of firms with only white men on 
their boards of directors.   
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IV DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
IV.1 Research Model Design 
This research model was designed as a comparative analysis using inferential statistics to 
interpret the differences in the means of three distinct sets of two sample groups from the 
population of 346,249 large U.S. corporations with annual revenues exceeding $500,000. The 
sample group sets for this study are listed below: 
 Boards With Boards with Only White Men 
A) Minority Women 73 87 
B) Minorities 238 87 
C) Women 297 87 
All data for this study were collected using publicly available secondary information. The 
independent variables were A) companies with minority women directors, B) companies with 
minority directors, and C) companies with women directors, which were all compared against 
companies with only white men on their boards of directors. The dependent variables were the 
five-year growth rates for return on assets (ROA), return on equity (ROE), and profit margin. 
Other data characteristics reported as a part of this study included number of directors on the 
company’s board, the age of the firm measured in years since incorporation, industry, and region. 
Each of the 2,594 corporate directors included in this study possessed at least six years of service 
on the company’s board. This number represents the duration of time that was examined (2011 
through 2015) plus one additional year prior to the start of the analysis, which was required to 
ensure that these board members would have had the opportunity to participate in the strategy 
formulation sessions covering the growth periods for this study. The data were analyzed using 
the IBM SPSS software program with some charts that developed in Microsoft Excel. An 
overview of the research is presented in Table 3 below: 
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Table 3: Summary of Research Design & Data Attributes 
Design Element Description 
Research Method Secondary Data Analysis 
Level of Analysis Individual Directors 
Unit of Analysis Corporation 
Data Source Hoover’s, NNDB.com, MorningStar.com, LinkedIn.com, Google.com 
Population Large U.S. Corporations -- $1M+ Annual Revenues (110,988 Firms) 
Sample 
U.S. Corporations Listed on NYSE or NASDAQ with publicly available financial and 
director data for each year between 2011 and 2015 (439 Firms) 
Industries Manufacturing, Wholesale/Retail, Services, Construction, Natural Resources/Utilities, 
Technology, Media/Telecommunications, Travel 
 Note: Population data retrieved from “2012 Economic Census of the United States” (2012). 
IV.2 Study Participants 
The selection of companies for participation in this research study was based on non-
probability sampling using the entire dataset provided by Hoover’s database. This dataset was 
comprised of companies with publicly available financial results for the years 2011 through 
2015, with listings on the New York Stock Exchange or NASDAQ stock market, and with 
headquarters in the United States. Initially, 449 companies pulled from Hoover’s database fitted 
this description, but, after inspection, ten companies were removed because they represented 
outliers with financial performance exceeding 5000% of the average return ratios. The final 
sample size was thus 439 companies, equal to the minimum sample size required based on a 
confidence interval of 95% and an accuracy percentage of 50% (“Sample Size Calculator”, 
2012). The minimum sample size was calculated using the web-based Sample Size Calculator 
tool, a public service by Creative Research Systems (a survey software company that works 
closely with Harvard University to provide tools and training on scholarly research methods).  
The median age of the firms in this study was 51 years with most firms falling within the 
26-to-50-year age frame as shown in Figure 4 below.   
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Figure 4: Histogram of Firm Ages.  
This figure shows the age of the firms with descriptive statistics presented in the upper right 
corner. 
The sample group of 439 companies operates across 32 industries, which were 
categorized into eight broader industry groups as depicted in Figure 5 below. As also shown in 
the figure, most these companies were in the manufacturing industry (134 firms) with various 
service industries following closely in number (123 firms). The remaining firms made up less 
than half (41%) of the sample.  
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Figure 5: Number of Firms in Each Industry Group. 
Drilling down into the 2,594 corporate director positions within the companies across all 
industries, Figure 7 below shows the distribution of the number of years that each director has 
served on the company’s board by gender and ethnicity. The pattern was similar across the 
dataset, with the majority of directors in each diversity group having between 9 and 15 years of 
service on the company’s board. This pattern is consistent with that of the overall dataset (also 
shown below). 
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Figure 6: Histograms of Director Tenure by Gender and Ethnicity. 
Histogram of showing the number of years on the board by gender and ethnicity. 
On average, there were (rounding up to the nearest whole number) about 4 white men, 1 
minority man, 1 white woman, and no minority women on the board of directors at each firm 
that had served at least six years on the firm’s board. Within the industry groups, the average 
number of directors that fell within each diversity group (white men, minority men, white 
women, and minority women) are depicted graphically in Figure 6 below.  
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Figure 7: Average Board Seats by Gender, Ethnicity, and Industry. 
Average number of board members by gender and ethnicity in each industry group. 
Although most firms included in the study were in the manufacturing and service 
industries, firms within these industries were not the most likely to include minority women on 
their boards. As shown in Figure 6, firms within the travel industry exhibited a higher likelihood 
than those within any other industry of having minority women on their boards of directors.  
The average board size for companies in this study was eight directors, which is listed 
along with other industry-specific averages in Table 4 below. As this table also shows, no 
statistically significant correlation was found between average firm age and number of minority 
women directors on the board. However, small positive correlations were detected between 
board size and number of women directors (regardless of ethnicity) and between firm age and 
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number of women directors (regardless of ethnicity). For minority directors, a moderate positive 
correlation between board size and number of directors and a small correlation between average 
firm age and number of directors were found.  
Table 4: Snapshot of Companies Included in Sample 
Number of Companies by Industry Group with Gender & Ethnicity Statistics, Board Size, Firm 
Age, and Region  
Industry 
% 
Minority 
Women 
Directors 
% 
Minority 
Directors 
% 
Women 
Directors 
# 
Companies 
Avg 
Board 
Size 
Avg 
Firm 
Age 
Most 
Common 
Region 
Construction 0.0% 8.3% 8.3% 5  7  50  South 
Manufacturing 2.6% 12.2% 18.8% 134  8  86  North 
Media/Telecommunications 2.9% 13.5% 16.3% 16  8  56  South 
Natural Resources/Utilities 4.0% 14.5% 17.8% 63  7  62  South 
Service 2.9% 12.2% 17.4% 123  8  66  North 
Technology 2.5% 9.1% 14.0% 45  7  41  West 
Travel 5.9% 16.5% 12.9% 15  8  59  South 
Wholesale/Retail 2.6% 10.8% 20.3% 38  8  69  Midwest 
        
Correlation: Avg. Board Size & % Minority Women 0.16 
    
Correlation: Avg. Firm Age & % Minority Women 0.07 
    
 
 
 
 
    
Correlation: Avg. Board Size & % Minority 0.30 
    
Correlation: Avg. Firm Age & % Minority 0.22 
    
 
 
 
 
    
Correlation: Avg. Board Size & % Women 0.25 
    
Correlation: Avg. Firm Age & % Women 0.19 
    
 
Table 4 above also shows the most common region for companies in each industry. 
Within the overall dataset, the most common region was the southern portion of the United 
States, and key southern states were Texas (37 companies), Georgia (17 companies), Virginia 
(14 companies), Florida, and North Carolina (each with 13 companies). The Midwest was 
primarily made up of companies in Illinois and Ohio, while the northern region was concentrated 
in New York and the western region in California.  
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IV.3 Data Collection 
No original data were collected for this study. Instead, secondary data in the form of 
company financial records, including annual revenue, net income, total assets, and total equity, 
were downloaded from the Hoover’s online database. The list of current corporate directors and 
the number of years that each director had served on the board was downloaded for each 
company from MorningStar.com. The ethnicity and gender of each corporate director was 
assessed by the researcher after either a review of photos available on company websites, social 
media websites such as LinkedIn or Facebook, or newspaper articles, or using the information 
listed on the Notable Names Database website (nndb.com). In the event of conflicting 
information from these various data sources (e.g., inconsistent director lists, etc.), the data found 
on the company’s website were designated as the most reputable source, followed by 
MorningStar.com, then by nndb.com. In determining a director’s ethnic background, I used my 
best judgment based on the photos available, and, if no photos were available, I deferred to the 
Notable Names Database. 
Because the global fiscal crisis occurred during 2008 with some effects lingering into 
2009, the financial records for many companies in the U.S. were expected to be distorted for 
those years. Additionally, limited public information was available on the ethnicity and gender of 
corporate directors before year 2000. For these reasons, the most recent five-year period of 
growth that could be analyzed in-depth was 2011 to 2015, which was the period chosen for this 
study. 
IV.4 Variables 
This study included four nominal independent variables, which were used to indicate 
whether the board consisted of only white men or contained at least one minority woman, at least 
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one ethnic minority, or at least one woman. Three continuous dependent variables were used to 
measure firm performance: net profit margin, return on assets (ROA), and return on equity 
(ROE). Profit margin was calculated as: (Total Sales Revenue – Total Expenses) ÷ Total Sales 
Revenue. ROA was calculated as: Net Income ÷ Total Assets. ROE was calculated as: Net 
Income ÷ Total Equity (Common Stock).  
IV.5 Data Analysis 
Following the data analysis procedures suggested by Burns and Burns (2008) and Pallant 
(2013) for hypothesis testing, t-tests of independent samples were performed to compare the 
means of each sample group (corporate boards with minority women, minorities, and women) to 
corporate boards with only white men using SPSS. This study investigated whether statistically 
significant differences in the influences of women, minorities, or minority women directors and 
of white men directors with respect to firm financial performance were detectable within the 
data. If a statistically significant difference was found to exist between the two groups, then the 
effect size was examined to determine the magnitude of the difference. The criteria for 
significant differences included wide variances between means, small standard deviations, and 
large sample sizes (Burns & Burns, 2008).  
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V RESULTS 
V.1 Boards with Minority Women vs. Those Comprised Only of White Men 
Using an independent sample t-test, the mean ROA, ROE, and profit margin of 
companies that included minority women on their boards of directors were compared against 
those of companies with only white men on their boards. As shown in Table 5, the means of each 
financial performance variable differed widely between these two groups. Further, Table 6 shows 
the results of applying the Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances, which are greater than 0.05 
for all financial performance variables, indicating that the assumption of equal variances for 
these two groups has not been violated. Table 6 also shows that the t-statistics were negative for 
all variables, which was consistent with the Hypotheses A and indicated that the mean of Group 
2 (i.e., companies that included minority women on their boards of directors) was higher than 
that of Group 1 (i.e., companies with only white men on their boards of directors).  
Notably, the mean growth rates of firms with only white men directors are exceedingly 
negative. These growth rates are calculated using the following formula: 
5 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
(2015 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 − 2011 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐)
2011 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐
 
As clarification, this calculation determines the both the direction and the magnitude of 
the percentage change in financial performance over the five-year period. It is important to note 
that this formula is not a comparison of the average annual performance during these years. It is, 
rather, a measurement of the extent that the performance metrics have increased or decreased 
over the five-year period. 
Finally, the results of the one-tailed significance test were calculated manually by 
dividing the results of the two-tailed significance test by two. These results, also displayed in 
Table 6, were equal to or less than 0.05 for all financial performance variables, showing that the 
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differences in the means of the two groups were statistically significant for each variable. Based 
on these results, I rejected the H1A, H2A, and H3A null hypothesis   
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis A 
Minority Women Included vs. Only White Men 
 
Only White Men 87 -69.6% 3.196        0.343        
Minority Women Included 73 11.4% 2.957        0.346        
Only White Men 87 -68.6% 2.465        0.264        
Minority Women Included 73 15.4% 3.110        0.364        
Only White Men 87 -80.8% 2.525        0.271        
Minority Women Included 73 9.8% 3.121        0.365        
Mean
Std. 
Deviation
Std. Error 
Mean
Minority Women Included vs. 
White Men Only
N
5yr ROE 
Growth
5yr ROA 
Growth
5yr Margin 
Growth
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Table 6:  T-Test Results for Hypothesis A 
Minority Women Included vs. Only White Men 
 
 
 The effect sizes were then calculated manually as follows: 
ƞ2 =  
𝑡2
𝑡2 + (𝑁1 + 𝑁2 − 2)
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−1.6512
−1.6512 + (87 + 73 − 2)
= 1.7% 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−1.9062
−1.9062 + (87 + 73 − 2)
= 2.2% 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−2.0282
−2.0282 + (87 + 73 − 2)
= 2.5% 
t df Low er Upper
Equal variances 3.355 0.069 -1.651 158 0.101 0.050 -0.810 0.490 -1.778 0.159
Not equal variances -1.662 156.461 0.098 0.049 -0.810 0.487 -1.772 0.152
Equal variances 1.055 0.306 -1.906 158 0.058 0.029 -0.840 0.441 -1.711 0.031
Not equal variances -1.868 136.219 0.064 0.032 -0.840 0.450 -1.730 0.049
Equal variances 2.484 0.117 -2.028 158 0.044 0.022 -0.905 0.446 -1.787 -0.024
Not equal variances -1.991 137.950 0.048 0.024 -0.905 0.455 -1.804 -0.006
Sig.
(1-tailed)
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
t-test for Equality of Means
Sig.
(2-tailed)
M ean 
Difference
5yr ROE Growth
5yr ROA Growth
5yr Margin Growth
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These effect sizes were then translated into relevant business terms by multiplying effect 
size by the mean. Although effect sizes below 6% are generally regarded as small (Pallant, 
2013), the effect sizes listed above are equivalent to a 1.2% change in ROE, a 1.5% change in 
ROA, and a 2.1% change in profit margin for firms with only white men on their corporate 
boards. On average, this was equivalent to an estimated $4.6 million in net income, $3.6 million 
in assets, and $6.4 million in equity. These estimations were calculated by multiplying the 
product of the effect size and the mean by average 2015 net income, assets, and equity, 
respectively, for the companies included in this study. Simply stated, the addition of minority 
women to a corporation’s board of directors is related to a significant increase in the firm’s 
accounting returns.  
V.2 Boards with Minorities vs. Those Comprised of Only White Men 
Using an independent sample t-test, the mean ROA, ROE, and profit margin of 
companies that included minorities on their boards of directors were compared against those of 
companies with only white men on the boards. As shown in Table 7, the means of each financial 
performance variable differed widely between these two groups.  
Notably, the mean growth rates of firms with only white men directors are exceedingly 
negative. These growth rates are calculated using the following formula: 
5 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
(2015 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 − 2011 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐)
2011 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐
 
As clarification, this calculation determines the both the direction and the magnitude of 
the percentage change in financial performance over the five-year period. It is important to note 
that this formula is not a comparison of the average annual performance during these years. It is, 
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rather, a measurement of the extent that the performance metrics have increased or decreased 
over the five-year period. 
Further, Table 8 shows the results of the Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances. For 
ROA, the result was greater than 0.05, indicating that the assumption of equal variances was not 
violated for that variable. However, for ROE and profit margin, the results were less than 0.05, 
indicating that the assumption of equal variances had been violated for those variables. 
Following the appropriate line of results on Table 8, we also see that a negative t-statistic was 
generated for all variables, as was consistent with the Hypotheses B and indicated that the Group 
2 mean (i.e., that of companies that included minorities on their boards of directors) was higher 
than that of Group 1 (i.e., companies with only white men on their boards of directors). Finally, 
the results of the one-tailed significance test were calculated manually by dividing the results of 
the two-tailed significance test by two. These results, also displayed in Table 8, were equal to or 
less than 0.05 for all financial performance variables, indicating that the differences in the means 
of these two groups was statistically significant for each variable. Based on these results, I 
rejected the H1B, H2B, and H3B null hypotheses. 
Table 7: Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis B 
Minorities Included vs. Only White Men 
  
Only White Men 87 -69.6% 3.196        0.343        
Minorities Included 238 32.2% 2.479        0.161        
Only White Men 87 -68.6% 2.465        0.264        
Minorities Included 238 24.0% 2.627        0.170        
Only White Men 87 -80.8% 2.525        0.271        
Minorities Included 238 12.6% 2.193        0.142        
Mean
 Std. 
Deviation 
 Std. Error 
Mean 
Minorities Included vs. 
White Men Only
N
5yr ROA 
Growth
5yr Margin 
Growth
5yr ROE 
Growth
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Table 8:  T-Test Results for Hypothesis B 
Minorities Included vs. Only White Men 
 
The effect sizes were then calculated manually as follows: 
ƞ2 =  
𝑡2
𝑡2 + (𝑁1 + 𝑁2 − 2)
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−2.6892
−2.6892 + (87 + 238 − 2)
= 2.2% 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−2.8612
−2.8612 + (87 + 238 − 2)
= 2.5% 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−3.0552
−3.0552 + (87 + 238 − 2)
= 2.8%
t df Low er Upper
Equal variances 4.817 0.029 -3.021 323 0.003 0.001 -1.018 0.337 -1.680 -0.355
Not equal variances -2.689 125.777 0.008 0.004 -1.018 0.378 -1.766 -0.269
Equal variances 1.562 0.212 -2.861 323 0.005 0.002 -0.926 0.324 -1.564 -0.289
Not equal variances -2.947 162.122 0.004 0.002 -0.926 0.314 -1.547 -0.306
Equal variances 9.223 0.003 -3.261 323 0.001 0.001 -0.934 0.286 -1.497 -0.370
Not equal variances -3.055 136.235 0.003 0.001 -0.934 0.306 -1.538 -0.329
Sig.
(1-tailed)
5yr ROE Growth
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
5yr ROA Growth
5yr Margin Growth
t-test for Equality of Means
Sig.
(2-tailed)
M ean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval
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These effect sizes were then translated into relevant business terms by multiplying the 
effect size by the mean. Although effect sizes below 6% are generally regarded as small (Pallant, 
2013), the effect sizes listed above were equivalent to a 1.5% change in ROE, a 1.7% change in 
ROA, and a 2.3% change in profit margin for firms with only white men on their corporate 
boards. On average, this was equivalent to an estimated $6.8 million in net income, $10.4 million 
in assets, and $9.6 million in equity. These estimations were calculated by multiplying the 
product of the effect size and the mean by the average 2015 net income, assets, and equity, 
respectively, for the companies included in this study. Simply stated, the addition of minorities to 
a corporation’s board of directors is related to a significant increase in the firm’s accounting 
returns. 
V.3  Boards with Women vs. Those Comprised Only of White Men 
Using an independent sample t-test, the mean ROA, ROE, and profit margin of 
companies that included women on their boards of directors were compared against those of 
companies with only white men on their boards. As shown in Table 9, the means of each 
financial performance variable differed widely between these two groups.  
Notably, the mean growth rates of firms with only white men directors are exceedingly 
negative. These growth rates are calculated using the following formula: 
5 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑒 =  
(2015 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐 − 2011 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐)
2011 𝑀𝑒𝑡𝑟𝑖𝑐
 
As clarification, this calculation determines the both the direction and the magnitude of 
the percentage change in financial performance over the five-year period. It is important to note 
that this formula is not a comparison of the average annual performance during these years. It is, 
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rather, a measurement of the extent that the performance metrics have increased or decreased 
over the five-year period. 
Further, Table 6 shows the results of Levene’s Test for Equality of Variances, which are 
greater than 0.05 for all financial performance variables, indicating that the assumption of equal 
variances for these two groups was not violated. As Table 10 also shows, the t-statistics were 
negative for all variables, which was consistent with the Hypotheses C and indicated that the 
Group 2 mean of (i.e., that of companies that included women on their boards of directors) was 
higher than that of Group 1 (i.e., companies with only white men on their boards of directors). 
Finally, the results of the one-tailed significance test were calculated manually by dividing the 
results of the two-tailed significance test by two. These results, also displayed in Table 10, were 
equal to or less than 0.05 for all financial performance variables, showing that the differences in 
the means of these two groups were significant for each variable. Based on these results, I 
rejected the H1C, H2C, and H3C null hypotheses. 
Table 9: Descriptive Statistics for Hypothesis C 
Women Included vs. Only White Men 
Only White Men 87 -69.6% 3.196        0.343        
Women Included 297 28.6% 2.801        0.163        
Only White Men 87 -68.6% 2.465        0.264        
Women Included 297 22.7% 2.494        0.145        
Only White Men 87 -80.8% 2.525        0.271        
Women Included 297 16.8% 2.785        0.162        
Women Included vs. 
White Men Only
N Mean
 Std. 
Deviation 
 Std. Error 
Mean 
5yr ROE 
Growth
5yr ROA 
Growth
5yr Margin 
Growth
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Table 10: T-Test Results for Hypothesis C 
Women Included vs. Only White Men 
 
 The effect sizes were then calculated manually as follows: 
ƞ2 =  
𝑡2
𝑡2 + (𝑁1 + 𝑁2 − 2)
 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−2.7832
−2.7832 + (87 + 297 − 2)
= 2.0% 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−3.0102
−3.0102 + (87 + 297 − 2)
= 2.3% 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑓𝑖𝑡 𝑀𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑖𝑛 𝐺𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡ℎ  ƞ2 =  
−2.9342
−2.9342 + (87 + 297 − 2)
= 2.2%
t df Low er Upper
Equal variances 2.980 0.085 -2.783 382 0.006 0.003 -0.982 0.353 -1.676 -0.288
Not equal variances -2.589 127.177 0.011 0.005 -0.982 0.379 -1.732 -0.231
Equal variances 1.493 0.222 -3.010 382 0.003 0.001 -0.913 0.303 -1.509 -0.317
Not equal variances -3.029 141.604 0.003 0.001 -0.913 0.301 -1.508 -0.317
Equal variances 3.653 0.057 -2.934 382 0.004 0.002 -0.976 0.333 -1.630 -0.322
Not equal variances -3.096 152.601 0.002 0.001 -0.976 0.315 -1.599 -0.353
Sig.
(1-tailed)
t-test for Equality of Means
Sig.
(2-tailed)
M ean 
Difference
Std. Error 
Difference
95% Confidence 
Interval
5yr ROE Growth
5yr ROA Growth
5yr Margin Growth
Levene's Test for 
Equality of Variances
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These effect sizes were then translated into relevant business terms by multiplying effect 
size by mean. Although effect sizes below 6% are generally regarded as small (Pallant, 2013), 
the effect sizes listed above were equivalent to a 1.4% change in ROE, a 1.6% change in ROA, 
and a 1.8% change in profit margin for firms with only white men on their corporate boards. On 
average, this was equivalent to an estimated $6.5 million in net income, $12.9 million in assets, 
and $10.9 million in equity. These estimations were calculated by multiplying the product of the 
effect size and the mean by the average 2015 net income, assets, and equity, respectively, for the 
companies included in this study. Simply stated, the addition of women to a corporation’s board 
of directors is related to a significant increase in the firm’s accounting returns. 
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VI DISCUSSION 
In this study, I investigated the relationship between gender and ethnic diversity within a 
corporation’s board of directors and the five-year growth rates in firm financial performance, 
specifically in ROA, ROE, and profit margin. To test this, I compared the average growth rates 
of corporate boards comprised of only white men to corporate boards that included minority 
women, minorities, and women. As a result, I found that the inclusion of each diversity group in 
the boardroom independently is related to statistically significant increases in ROA, ROE, and 
profit margin. These results are in line with both upper echelons theory and the conversion 
theory of minority influence. Notably, however, the diversity groups that included ethnic 
minorities of either gender had the strongest effect sizes, particularly in regard to profit margin 
growth. These findings are summarized in Table 11 below.  
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Table 11: Summary of Findings 
Hypothesis Description Results Effect Size 
H1A 
The 5-year growth rates in ROA of firms with minority 
women on their boards of directors are greater than those of 
firms without minority women on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
2.2% 
$3.5 Million 
H2A 
The 5-year growth rates in ROE of firms with minority women 
on their boards of directors are greater than those of firms 
without minority women on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
1.7% 
$6.4 Million 
H3A 
The 5-year growth rates in profit margin of firms with 
minority women on their boards of directors are greater than 
those of firms without minority women on their boards of 
directors. 
Supported 
2.5% 
$4.6 Million 
H1B 
The 5-year growth rates in ROA of firms with minorities on 
their boards of directors are greater than those of firms without 
minorities on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
2.5% 
$10.4 Million 
H2B 
The 5-year growth rates in ROE of firms with minorities on 
their boards of directors are greater than those of firms without 
minorities on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
2.2% 
$9.6 Million 
H3B 
The 5-year growth rates in profit margin in firms with 
minorities on their boards of directors are greater than those of 
firms without minorities on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
2.8% 
$6.8 Million 
H1C 
The 5-year growth rates in ROA of firms with women on their 
boards of directors are greater than those of firms without 
women on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
2.3% 
$12.9 Million 
H2C 
The 5-year growth rates in ROE of firms with women on their 
boards of directors are greater than those of firms without 
women on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
2.0% 
$10.9 Million 
H3C 
The 5-year growth rates in profit margin of firms with women 
on their boards of directors are greater than those of firms 
without women on their boards of directors. 
Supported 
2.2% 
$6.5 Million 
As predicted, these results show evidence that the persons at the top of the corporate 
ladder may indeed influence the bottom line of the organization. Although this relationship has 
already been established in the literature in support of upper echelons theory (Aziri, 2014; 
Hambrick, 2007; Hambrick & Mason, 1984), the results of this study reinforced claims in the 
literature that these positions are valid. Additionally, these findings also confirmed the validity of 
the theoretical concepts of minority influence. In particular, it appears that the opinions of the 
minority group members ignite divergent thinking within those boards of directors, as the boards 
with minority directors appear to make strategic decisions that are fundamentally different from 
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those made by boards comprised only white men, as evidenced by the differences in the mean 
growth rates for each financial performance metric between these two groups. However, the 
small effect sizes of these results indicate that, even as increased diversity is apparently linked to 
increased growth, the magnitude of this achievement is notably small, although the fact that there 
are substantially fewer firms having minorities and minority women in particular as directors 
(when compared to the number of firms with white men and white women directors, 
respectively) may contribute to the small effect sizes. 
VI.1 Implications for Academic Research 
A considerable amount of the research on the relationship between boardroom diversity 
and firm financial performance has been stimulated by upper echelons theory (Hassan et al., 
2015; Post & Byron, 2015), agency theory (Carter et al., 2010; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Liu et al., 
2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ujunwa et al., 2012), and resource dependency theory (Carter et al., 
2010; Isidro & Sobral, 2015; Liu et al., 2013; Nguyen et al., 2015; Ntim, 2015; Ujunwa et al., 
2012). Underlying each of these theories is the assumption that board members must collaborate 
to collectively influence firm performance. This study contributes to theory by examining the 
results of this boardroom collaboration through the added scope of minority influence, which 
lends itself to a more nuanced explanation of the results. Furthermore, the findings of this study 
will have a significant impact within academia, as it fills the gap in empirical research comprised 
of the combined outcomes of ethnic and gender diversity as they relate to firm financial results. 
This additional insight represents an important contribution across the increasingly popular and 
academically relevant domain of diversity in leadership as it relates to gender and cultural studies 
in corporate governance. Also, by focusing on medium-term growth rather than short-term 
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performance, this study provides greater depth to the field by taking a unique perspective on firm 
financial performance. 
VI.2 Implications for the Business Community 
As businesses often attempt to replicate the best practices of high-performing firms in an 
effort to achieve similar performance levels, the results of this study suggest that organizations 
should strongly consider altering their recruitment and retention efforts, particularly regarding 
diversity policies and practices at the executive leadership level, in order to achieve increased 
growth in firm financial performance. The findings of this study, which show a positive 
relationship between boardroom diversity and firm accounting returns imply that the business 
community should strive to incorporate a greater range of diversity in their boardrooms. 
Additionally, businesses should  target adding minority women, specifically, because this often-
overlooked segment of the leadership community are associated with more potent increases in 
profitability.  
VI.3 Limitations 
A key limitation of the study was the potential for some other stimuli to act as a catalyst 
for board performance, rather than the diversity of the board itself. For example, previous studies 
have indicated that “larger boards may limit the influence of any individual director and may 
constrain the extent to which the board in general influences firm-level decisions” (Post & 
Byron, 2015). For this reason, board size was documented and controlled for as a part of this 
study. Furthermore, a study in the British Journal of Management found that women directors 
are most often appointed to boards in periods of downturn of the company’s stock, which might 
explain the poor accounting returns that are experienced after women are appointed to boards, as 
the negative performance may have already been in progress (Ryan & Haslam, 2005). 
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Another limitation of the current research is that similar outcomes may not apply to 
smaller firms. This study only included firms that are traded on the NYSE and NASDAQ, and 
firms listed on these stock exchanges are inherently large in terms of assets and income. This is 
due primarily to the financial requirements for listing on these exchanges (Cheng & Stunda, 
2015). NASDAQ requires at least $1 million in annual income, $75 million in assets, and 1.1 
million shares of stock distributed to at least 400 shareholders and valued at $15 million. 
Similarly, the NYSE requires at least $2 million in annual income, $75 million in assets, and 1.1 
million shares of stock distributed to at least 400 shareholders and valued at $50 million. Thus, 
the likelihood of small firms being included in these exchanges, and consequentially, in this 
analysis, was very small.  
Finally, because of time constraints, this study was unable to incorporate a more in-depth 
examination of the impacts of each minority director included in the study. Future research in 
this area should incorporate a staggered, individualized analysis of accounting returns in the five-
year period directly before and after the entry of each minority director on the board to determine 
if any significant change can be documented surrounding the inclusion of that particular director.  
VI.4 Future Research 
Although the statistical methods used in this study can be useful toward predicting the 
relative profitability of firms based on the presence of ethnic or gender diversity within their 
boards, these methods do not allow for the assertion of casual inferences. While the current 
research has established temporal precedence (at least partly) and covariation, future researchers 
should focus on eliminating any alternative explanations for these positive relationships so as to 
establish causality between boardroom diversity and increased accounting returns. 
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Furthermore, this study was a general investigation of the financial growth associated 
with boardroom diversity over a wide range of industries. However, a more targeted version of 
this analysis could be beneficial in terms of industrial contexts. That type of focus would also 
allow for a more comprehensive study of organizational performance to include operational 
benchmarks and social responsibility in an approach similar to a balanced scorecard, thus 
providing a more impactful examination for engaged scholarship and evidence-based 
management audiences. Other possible areas of research are the regional differences related to 
diversity practices and firm performance and a mixed-methods approach employing interviews 
with board directors to examine the effects of minority influence from a first-person perspective.  
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